United States Supreme Court: 1991-92 Term by Giannelli, Paul C.
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Publications 
1992 
United States Supreme Court: 1991-92 Term 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Case Western University School of Law, paul.giannelli@case.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Giannelli, Paul C., "United States Supreme Court: 1991-92 Term" (1992). Faculty Publications. 304. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/304 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
I 
Vol. 15, No. 4 
KFO 
578 
.All! 
P82 
c.l 
Fall1992 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 1991-92 TERM."·~ 
,. ,.~;~~~ If \; 
Paul C. Giannelli g !; y ;~- ·~J ;..:..,._ 'i._.r VV 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W. Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
This article summarizes many of the U.S. Supreme 
Court's criminal law decisions of the last term. Once 
again the Court explored the relationship between the 
hearsay rule and the Confrontation Clause. The Court 
also revisited the use of peremptory challenges based on 
race. Special attention is given to these two topics 
because of the continuing recent litigation in these areas. 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
The Court again considered the use of peremptory 
challenges on a racial basis in Georgia v. McCollum, 112 
S. Ct. 2348 (1992). The defendants were charged with 
aggravated assault and battery. They were white, the 
victims were African-American, and the prosecution 
expected to show that race was a factor in the alleged 
assaults. The prosecution moved pretrial for an order 
prohibiting the defense from using its peremptory 
challenges to exclude African-American jurors. 
Early Cases 
The Supreme Court had long held that racial discrimi-
nation in the jury selection process offended the Equal 
Protection Clause. In Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303 (1880), decided soon after the adoption of the 14th 
Amendment, the Court invalidated a state statute provid-
ing that only white men could serve as jurors. However, it 
was not until 1965 in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 
(1965), that the Court for the first time considered the use 
of peremptory challenges as a device to exclude jurors 
because of their race. The Court rejected Swain's chal-
lenge, but indicated that the systematic exclusion of 
African-Americans through the use of peremptories over 
a period of time might establish an Equal Protection viola-
tion. This burden, however, was difficult to satisfy. 
Batson v. Kentucky 
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Court 
jeparted from Swain by holding that a defendant could 
:lstablish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination 
n the selection of the petit jury solely on the prosecutor's 
3Xercise of peremptory challenges in that case. Estab-
ishing systematic exclusion over a period of time, as 
>uggested in Swain, was not required. Once the 
Jblic Defender Hyman Friedman 
defendant makes a prima facie showing of the racial 
basis for the peremptory strikes, the burden shifts to the 
prosecution to offer a race-neutral explanation for the 
strikes. The Court rested its decision on Equal Protection 
grounds. 
Sixth Amendment Fair Cross-Section Requirement 
In a subsequent decision, Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 
474 (1990), the defendant made a Sixth Amendment 
challenge, based on the "fair cross section" guarantee of 
the right to trial by jury. The Court ruled that the "fair 
cross section'' requirement applied to the jury pool and 
not to the petit jury chosen from that pool. Thus, peremp-
tory challenges could not be attacked on Sixth Amend-
ment grounds. Five Justices, however, suggested that an 
Equal Protection challenge might be successful. Justice 
Kennedy, writing a concurring opinion, indicated that he 
would side with the four dissenting Justices if a Four-
teenth Amendment challenge had been raised: "I find it 
essential to make clear that if the claim here were based 
on the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause, 
it would have merit." /d. at 488. 
Standing 
In Powers v. Ohio, 111 S.Ct. 1364 (1991), a white defen-
dant challenged the prosecutor's use of peremptory 
challenges to exclude black venirepersons from a jury in 
an aggravated murder prosecution. The principal prob-
lem with the Equal Protection argument raised in Powers 
concerned the issue of standing. Batson, a black man, 
had challenged the exclusion of other blacks from the 
jury. Powers, however, was a white defendant challeng-
ing the exclusion of black jurors. The issue turned on 
whether a white defendant suffered any harm in this situ-
ation. The Court held that Powers had suffered harm: 
The purpose of the jury system is to impress upon 
the criminal defendant and the community as a whole 
that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in 
accordance with the law by persons who are fair. The 
verdict will not be accepted or understood in these 
terms if the jury is chosen by unlawful means at the 
outset. Upon these considerations, we find that a 
criminal defendant suffers a real injury when the 
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prosecutor excludes jur()rS at his or her own trial Of! 
account of race.ld. at 1372. 
This analysis was also supported by a third-party stand-
ing argument, with the Court finally concluding "that a 
defendant in a criminal case can raise the third-party 
equal protection claims of jurors excluded by the prose-
cution because of their race." /d. at 1373. 
Civil Cases 
In Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company, Inc., 111 
S.Ct. 2077 (1991), the Court extended Batson to civil liti-
gation. This case is important because it suggested the 
answer to another issue: Does Batson apply to the defen-
dant's use of peremptory challenges? the principal issue 
is whether there is state action when the defendant 
strikes jurors on racial grounds, an issue also critical in 
analyzing whether Batson applies to civil litigation. The 
Court in Edmonson wrote: 
Though the motive of a peremptory challenge may be 
to protect a private interest, the objective of jury selec-
tion proceedings is to determine representation on a 
governmental body. Were it not for peremptory 
challenges, there would be no question that the entire 
process of determining who will serve on the jury 
constitutes state action. The fact that the government 
delegates some portion of this power to private liti-
gants does not change the governmental character of 
the power exercised. /d. at 2086. 
Defense Peremptory Challenges 
In McCollum the Court ruled that the defense also 
came within the Batson rule. Citing Edmonson, the Court 
found that the defense use of peremptory challenges 
amounted to "state action" within the meaning of the 
14th Amendment. According to the Court, the jury fulfills 
a "unique and constitutionally 1:;oll'lpeiiE)d governmental 
function" and the peremptory challenge system could 
not exist without significant governmental participation. 
112 S. Ct. at 2355. The Court went on to note: "Regard-
less of who precipitated the jurors' removal, the percep-
tion and the reality in a criminal trial will be that the court 
has excused jurors based on race, an outcome that will 
be attributed to the State." /d. at 2356. 
Next, the Court ruled that the prosecution had standing 
to raise the issue. While the Court acknowledged that 
third-party standing is the exception rather than the rule, 
it believed that third-party standing was appropriate in 
this context. The State suffers injury "when the fairness 
and integrity of its own judicial process is undermined." 
/d. at 2357. In addition, excluded potential jurors face 
formidable barriers in filing a civil rights suit to rectify 
such discrimination. 
Finally, the Court ruled that the defendant's rights were 
not violated by this outcome. The Court observed that 
"peremptory challenges are not constitutionally protected 
fundamental rights; rather, they are but one state- created 
means to the constitutional end of an impartial jury and a 
fair trial." /d. at 2358. The defendants also argued that 
requiring the defense to explain its reasons for exercising 
peremptory challenges, a real possibility under Batson, 
would violate the right to counsel and the attorney-client 
privilege. The Court rejected this argument, noting that 
~he defense could state its reasons in camera if it 
believed that its trial strategy would be revealed. 
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Moreover, "neither the Sixth Amendment right nor the 
attorney-client privilege gives a criminal defendant the 
right to carry out through counsel an unlawful course of · 
conduct." /d. 
RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
During the last term, the Supreme Court once again 
considered the relationship between the hearsay rule 
and the Confrontation Clause. The case was White v. 
Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736 (1992), a child sexual abuse prose-
cution, in which the child's hearsay statements were 
admitted in evidence. The trial court ruled the statements 
.l3.dmil5~if:)l~ l11lc:l~r tw9 hearsa,y 13xgeptions: excited utter-
ances and statements made for the purpose of medical 
treatment. An understanding of White requires an 
appreciation of the Court's earlier decisions. 
Roberts v. Ohio: The Two-Pronged Test 
In Roberts v. Ohio, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), the Court identi-
fied two values underlying the Confrontation Clause: the 
"Framers' preference for face-to-face accusation" and an 
"underlying purpose to augment accuracy in the factfind-
ing process." /d. at 65. From these values, the Court 
derived a two-pronged analysis that focused on (1) the 
unavailability of the declarant and (2) the reliability of the 
hearsay statement. The Court wrote: 
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for 
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause 
normally requires a showing that[ the declarant] is 
unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible 
only if it bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliabil-
ity can be inferred without more in a case where the 
evidence falls within a firmly root~d hearsay exception. 
In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least 
absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness. /d. at 66. . . 
This summation of confrontation requirements immedi-
ately raised problems. Roberts involved the admissibility 
of a preliminary hearing transcript as former testimony, a 
hearsay exception that traditionally required a showing of 
unavailability. Most hearsay exceptions, however, do not 
require such a showing. Did the Court intend to impose 
an unavailability requirement on every exception? As one 
commentator noted, "Beneath [Roberts') apparently 
orthodox disposition ... lies an interpretation of possibly 
far-reaching significance." Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation 
Clause and Ohio v. Roberts, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 207, 224 (1984). 
The Demise of the Two-Pronged Test 
In 1986 the Court modified Roberts' two-pronged 
approach, which required a showing of both reliability 
and unavailability. United States v. lnadi, 475 U.S. 387 
(1986), which involved the coconspirator exception to the 
hearsay rule, appeared to limit Roberts' unavailability 
requirement to cases in which former testimony is 
introduced. The Court wrote: 
Roberts should not be read as an abstract answer to 
questions not presented in that case, but rather as a 
resolution of the issue the Court said it was examining: 
"the constitutional propriety of the introduction in 
evidence of the preliminary hearing testimony of a 
witness not produced at the defendant's subsequent 
state criminal trial." /d. at 392-93 (quoting Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 58 (1980)). 
The Court also wrote that Roberts should not be read "to 
stand for the radical proposition that no out-of-court state-
ment can be introduced by the government without a 
shewing that the declarant is unavailable." ld. at 394. 
The Court reaffirmed this position in White: "Roberts 
stands for the proposition that unavailability analysis is a 
necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only 
when the challenged out-of-court statements were made 
in the course of a prior judicial proceeding." /d. at 741 
(emphasis added). Thus, despite the language in 
Roberts, a showing of unavailability is not always 
demanded. 
Dispensing With the Unavailability Requirement 
lnadi and White not only limit the unavailability require-
ment set forth in Roberts, they also establish blanket 
rules dispensing with the requirement for at least some 
hearsay exceptions- the coconspirator exception in 
/nadi and the excited utterance and medical diagnosis 
exceptions in White. The Court offered two reasons for 
these rulings. 
First, these exceptions differed from the former 
testimony exception at issue in Roberts. Unlike former 
testimony, coconspirator statements "provide evidence 
of the conspiracy's context that cannot be replicated, 
even if the declarant testifies to the same matters in 
court." lnadi, 475 U.S. at 395. Similarly, the Court in White 
noted that excited utterances and statements made for 
the purpose of medical diagnosis had substantial proba-
tive value that "could not be duplicated simply by the 
declarant later testifying in court." 112 S. Ct. at 743. 
The second reason concerned what the Court 
perceived to be an unnecessary burden on the prosecu-
tion. The prosecution subpoenas those witnesses that it 
needs, and the same opportunity is guaranteed to the 
defense under the Compulsory Process Clause. Thus, 
an unavailability rule would operate only in those cases 
where neither side wanted to call the witness. According 
to the Court, this would "impose substantial additional 
burdens on the factfinding process" because the prose-
cution would "be required to repeatedly locate and keep 
continuously available each declarant." /d. at 742. 
The Reliability Requirement 
Decisions after Roberts also considered the second 
(reliability) prong. Under this prong, a hearsay statement 
satisfies confrontation requirements either because the 
statement (1) falls within a "firmly rooted" hearsay excep-
tion or (2) possesses "particularized guarantees of trust-
worthiness." 
Like lnadi, Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 
(1987), considered a confrontation challenge to coconspi-
rator statements, This time, however, the reliability 
requirement was the focus of the litigation. Tracing the 
judicial history of the coconspirator exception back over a 
:::entury and a half, the Court found the exception "firmly 
:mough rooted in our jurisprudence." /d. at 183, Accord-
ngly, such statements automatically satisfy confrontation 
jemands for reliability. 
The Court adopted the same analysis in White, writing 
hat there "can be no doubt" that the excited utterance 
md medical diagnosis hearsay exceptions are "firmly 
ooted." The Court noted that the excited utterance 
!Xception had been recognized for "at least two centuries" 
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and both the Federal Rules of Evidence and nearly "four-
fifths" of the states had adopted it. 112 S. Ct. at 742 n. 8. 
In sum, the Court in determining reliability in both 
cases simply looked to see how long a hearsay exception 
had been recognized and how extensively it had been 
adopted throughout the country. 
Exceptions Not ''Firmly Rooted'' 
If a hearsay exception is not "firmly rooted," the Sixth 
Amendment requires that "particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness" accompany the making of the hearsay 
statement. This was the Court's holding in Idaho v. 
Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990), which involved the admis-
sibility of a child's statement under a residual hearsay 
exception. This requirement involves a case-by-case 
approach that considers the "totality of the circum-
stances" at the time the statement was made. 
This approach, according to the Court, precludes 
consideration of independent corroborating circum-
stances in determining reliability. "[T]he relevant circum-
stances include only those that surround the making of 
the statement and that render the declarant particularly 
worthy of belief." /d. at 3148. In rejecting reliance on 
corroborating proof, the Court wrote: 
[T]he use of corroborating evidence to support a hear-
say statement's "particularized guarantees of trustwor-
thiness" would permit admission of a presumptively 
unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustvvor-
thiness of other evidence at trial, a result we think at 
odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence 
admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so trust-
worthy that cross-examination of the declarant would 
be of marginal utility. /d. at 3150. 
Conclusion 
Despite the Court's statements in earlier cases, the 
latest decisions suggest that the Confrontation Clause 
does nothing more than "constitutionalize" the law of 
hearsay. "Firmly rooted" exceptions are presumptively 
reliable, and at this point the unavailability requirement 
has been applied only to former testimony, which, under 
traditional hearsay law, always required such a showing. 
GRAND JURY PRACTICE 
United States v. Williams, 112 S.Ct. 1735 (1992), 
involved the prosecutor's failure to present exculpatory 
evidence to a federal grand jury investigating false state-
ments made to a federally insured bank as part of loan 
applications. Williams alleged that the government had 
chosen not to present evidence to the grand jury that 
would have negated an intent to mislead the banks, an 
essential element of the charged offense. Williams did 
not argue that the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury 
indictment required the prosecution to present exculpato-
ry evidence. Rather, he based his argument on the feder-
al courts supervisory power. 
The Supreme Court ruled against Williams. The Court 
pointed out that the grand jury has historically operated 
independently of the courts: "[T]he whole theory of its 
function is that it belongs to no branch of the institutional 
government, serving as a kind of buffer or referee 
between the Government and the People." /d. at 1742. 
Accordingly, the grand jury can investigate upon mere 
suspicion, need not identify the offender it suspects, nor 
is it required to indicate the precise charge it is investigat-
ing. The grand jury does not need prior judicial approval 
to investigate or to indict. Judicial supervision occurs 
only when the grand jury attempts to compel the appear-
ance of witnesses or the production of evidence. In this 
context, the courts will refuse to support the grand jury 
only when a constitutional or common law privilege is 
asserted by a witness. Given this history, the Court 
refused to intrude into the process. 
The Court also rested its decision on the limited func-
tion of a grand jury when deciding to indict. Historically, 
the grand jury doE)S 11Qtd(3t~rmine guilt or innocence. It 
evaluates only whether there is sufficient evidence to 
proceed to trial, which requires only a consideration of 
the prosecution's evidence. The defendant does not have 
a right to testify nor a right to present evidence. Conse-
quently, the prosecutor has no obligation to present such 
evidence. The Court wrote: "If the grand jury has no obli-
gation to consider all 'substantial exculpatory' evidence, 
we do not understand how the prosecutor can be said to 
have a binding obligation to present it." /d. at 1745. 
SPEEDY TRIAL 
The Court considered a Sixth Amendment speedy trial 
claim in Doggett v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2686 (1992). 
In 19!30 Doggett was indicted for conspiring to import and 
distribute cocaine. He left the country before he could be 
arrested. The DEA agents in charge of the case subse-
quently learned that Doggett had been arrested on drug 
charges in Panama. They requested Panamanian officials 
to ''expel" Doggett to the u.s: Doggett, however, was 
later released and traveled to Colombia, where he stayed 
for-.several months. In September 1982 he re-entered the 
United States and passed unhindered through U.S. 
Customs in New York. He settled in Virginia, where he 
married, earned a college degree, held a steady job, 
lived openly under his own name, and stayed within the 
law. In September 1988 the Marshall's Service ran a 
routine credit check on severai thousand people subject 
to outstanding warrants, a procedure that located 
Doggett. He was subsequently arrested - 6 years after 
he returned to tlie u:s. i:fnd 8 arid1f2 years after indict-
ment. He moved to dismiss the charges on speedy trial 
grounds. 
The Supreme Court agreedwithDoggett's claim and 
reversed his conviction. An earlier case, Barker v. Wingo, 
407 U.S. 514 (1972), set forth a four-pronged analysis for 
determining whether the constitutional right to a speedy 
trial has been violated: 
[1]whether the delay before trial was uncommonly 
long, [2]whether the government or the criminal 
def~ndant is more to blame for that delay, [3] whether, 
in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a 
speedy trial, and [4] whether he suffered prejudice as 
the delay's result. 112 S. Ct. at 2690. 
The Court then proceeded to apply these factors. The 
"extraordinary 81!2 years lag" clearly sufficed to trigger a 
closer inquiry into the other factors. As for the second 
factor, the record showed that for six years the govern-
ment made no serious effort to find Doggett. Had they 
done so, they would have located him "within minutes." 
Moreover, there was no evidence that Doggett knew of 
the indictment prior to his departure out of the country. 
Indeed, his assertions of ignorance were supported by 
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other evidence in the record. Thus, the critical factor 
turned on the fourth factor- whether Doggett had 
suffered any prejudice. 
Neither side could establish specific prejudice or lack 
thereof. The Court, however, held that 
excessive delay presumptively compromises the relia-
bility of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, 
for that matter, identify. While such presumptive preju-
dice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim 
without regard to the other Barker criteria, ... it is part 
of the mix of relevant tacts, and its importance 
increases with the length of delay. /d. at 2693. 
Had the prosecution pursued Doggett with due diligence, 
his speedy trial claim would have failed. Had the prose-
cution intentionally held back to gain some impermissi-
ble advantage, Doggett's claim could easily be accepted; 
official bad faith counts heavily against the prosecution. 
Doggett's circumstances, however, fell someplace 
between these two extremes. The Court believed that the 
delay was simply too long and the negligence too great. 
The Court observed: "The Government, indeed, can 
hardly complain too loudly, for persistent neglect in 
concluding a criminal prosecution indicates an uncom-
monly feeble interest in bringing an accused to justice; 
the more weight the Government attaches to securing a 
conviction, the harder it will try to get it." /d. at 2693-94. 
-DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
In United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992), the 
defendant was prosecuted for drug transactions that 
occurred in Oklahoma, including a conspiracy count. At 
a prior trial for drug transactions in Missouri, the Oklahoma 
transactions had been admitted as "other acts" evidence 
under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). 
Felix argued that the prosecution was foreclosed from 
presenting evidence of the Oklahoma drug operation 
because that evidence had been used in the prior 
Missouri trial. The Supreme Court rejected this argu-
ment, holding that the evidentiary use of the Oklahoma 
transactions at the Missouri trial was not the same as 
prosecuting the defendant for those offenses, and thus 
the Double Jeopardy Clause did not bar the later prose-
cution for the Oklahoma transactions. Citing Dowling v. 
United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990), the Court recognized 
a "basic, yet important, principle that the introduction of 
relevant evidence of particular misconduct in a case is 
not the same thing as prosecution for that conduct." /d. 
at 1383. 
Felix also argued that his conviction of the conspiracy 
count violated the ban against double jeopardy. Of the 
nine overt acts offered to support the conspiracy charge, 
two were based on the conduct for which Felix had been 
previously prosecuted in Missouri. He based his argu-
ment on Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), which held 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars prosecution where 
the Government, "to establish an essential element of an 
offense charged in that prosecution, will prove conduct 
that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has 
already been prosecuted." /d. at 521. 
The Court bypassed the Grady rule by citing earlier 
precedents, which it said had not been overruled by 
Grady: "But long antedating any of these cases, and not 
questioned in any of them, is the rule that a substantive 
crime, and a conspiracy to commit that crime, are not the 
'same offense' for double jeopardy purposes." 112 S. Ct. 
at 1384. For example, in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 
U.S. 640 (1946), the Court wrote that "the commission of 
the substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit it are 
separate and distinct offenses ... [a]nd the plea of 
double jeopardy is no defense to a conviction for both 
offenses." /d. at 643. Similarly, in Garrett v. United States, 
471 U.S. 773 (1985), the Court noted that "it does not 
violate the Double Jeopardy Clause ... to prosecute [a 
continuing criminal enterprise] after a prior conviction for 
one of the predicate offenses." /d. at 793. See also United 
States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947). 
The Court went on to hold that these precedents 
controlled rather than the Grady rule. 
HEARSAY RULE 
In United States v. Salerno, 112 S. Ct. 2503 (1992), the 
Supreme Court interpreted Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1), which 
is similar to the Ohio rule. Two immunized witnesses 
testified before a grand jury investigating racketeering. 
They testified that neither they nor the defendants had 
participated in the alleged racketeering scheme. When 
the defense called these witnesses at trial, they asserted 
their Fifth Amendment privilege to remain silent. The 
defense then offered their grand jury testimony as former 
testimony, arguing that the prosecution had had the 
opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses at the grand 
jury proceedings. This opportunity, they argued, satisfied 
the requirement of Rule 804(b)(1)- that the party against 
whom the testimony is offered had a "similar motive" to 
examine the hearsay declarant at the prior proceeding. 
The district court ruled the evidence inadmissible 
because the prosecution's motive in questioning a grand 
jury witness in the investigatory stages of a case is far 
different from its motive at trial. The Second Circuit 
reversed, holding that the prosecutor's motive when 
examining the witness was not critical when the govern-
ment obtains immunized testimony in a grand jury 
proceeding from a witness who refuses to testify at trial. 
According to the court, "adversarial fairness" required 
this result. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the courts 
had to apply the "similar motive" requirement as enacted 
by Congress. The courts have no authority to disregard 
the congressional language in order to achieve "adver-
:.arial fairness." The Supreme Court, howeve·r, did not 
jecide the "similar motive" issue because the court of 
3.ppeals had not considered that issue. Accordingly, the 
:ourt remanded the case on this point. Justice Stevens, 
jissenting, stated that the prosecution clearly had an 
'opportunity and similar motive" to develop by direct or 
~ross-examination the grand jury testimony. 
TRIAL BY JURY: CAPITAL CASES 
Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S.Ct. 2222 (1992), can be 
lescribed as a "reverse Witherspoon" case. During the 
roir dire of jurors in a capital case, the defense requested 
he judge to inquire whether any of the jurors would auto-
natically impose the death penalty if the defendant was 
:onvicted. The judge refused to ask the question. The 
1rosecution's questions concerning the Witherspoon 
equirements were permitted. Under Witherspoon v. 
linois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), potential jurors may be 
lisqualified for cause if they would refuse in all instances 
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to impose the death penalty upon conviction. Thus, all 
jurors were asked whether they would automatically vote 
against the death penalty no matter what the facts of the 
case were. The accused's question was the reverse-
whether the jurors would automatically impose the death 
penalty. 
On review, the Supreme Court found that the defen-
dant had a right to have his question put to the jurors. 
The Sixth Amendment does not require a jury determina-
tion concerning the death penalty. However, once a state 
chooses to use juries in this context, due process 
requires that the jury be impartial. Witherspoon and its 
progeny recognize this principle. They hold that "a juror 
who in no case would vote for capital punishment, 
regardless of his or her instructions, is not an impartial 
juror and must be removed for cause." 112 S. Ct. at 2229. 
See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985); Adams 
v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980). 
In Morgan the Court ruled that this analysis also 
applied to jurors who held the opposite predilection: 
A juror who will automatically vote for the death penal-
ty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the 
evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances 
as the instructions will require him to do. Indeed, 
because such a juror has already formed an opinion 
on the merits, the presence or absence of either 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely 
irrelevant to such a juror. Therefore, based on the 
requirement of impartiality embodied in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a capi-
tal defendant may challenge for cause any prospective 
juror who maintains such views. If even one such juror 
is empaneled and the death sentence is imposed, the 
State is disentitled to execute .the sentence. /d. at 
2229-30. 
This requirement necessarily means that the defendant 
must be allowed to inquire about the individual juror's 
views on this issue. 
The Court also commented that Witherspoon had not 
recognized any "right" on the part of the State. Rather, it 
had limited the prosecution's power to exclude jurors who 
had scruples concerning the death penalty. Only those 
who would automatically vote against the death penalty 
could be excluded for cause: 
[A] State may not entrust the determination of whether 
a man should live or die to a tribunal organized to 
return a verdict of death. Specifically, we hold that a 
sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that 
imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding 
veniremen for cause simply because they voiced 
general objections to the death penalty or expressed 
conscientious or religious scruples against its inflic-
tion. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520-23. 
COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 
Medina v. California, 112 S. Ct. 2572 (1992), involved 
the burden of proof in cases in which a competency to 
stand trial issue is raised. A California statute allocated 
the burden to the defendant by a preponderance of 
evidence. 
The Supreme Court's prior cases clearly established 
that due process precluded the trial of a criminal defen-
dant who was incompetent. Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 
162 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966). "[T]he 
test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to 
consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of 
rational understanding - and whether he has a rational 
as well as factual understanding of the proceedings 
against him." Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 
(1960). 
After canvassing both the English and American 
precedents, the Court could find "no settled tradition" on 
the "burden of proof" issue. Moreover, contemporary 
practice is also divided, with some states allocating the 
burden tb the prosecution and some to the defense. 
Given this background, the Court could not "say that the 
allocation of the burden of proof to a criminal defendant 
to prove incompetence 'offends some principle of justice 
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people 
as to be ranked as fundamental.' " 112 S. Ct. at2577 
(citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)). 
Accordingly, the Court ruled against Medina. The 
Court wrote: 
Once a State provides a defendant access to proce-
dures for making a competency evaluation, however, 
we perpeive no basis for holding that due process 
further requires the State to assume the burden of 
vindicating the defendant's constitutional right by 
persuading the trier of fact that the defendant is 
competent to stand trial. /d. at 2579. 
E:MTDADMI=NT 
..... ._I I IT""'I• •••-•'~~ • 
Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535 (1992), 
raised an entrapment issue. Jacobson was convicted of 
receiving child pornography through the mails. In 1984 
Jacobson ordered two magazines, entitled Bare Boys I 
andBareBoys II, from a California bookstore. At that time 
receipt of these magazines was legal under both federal 
and state law. Postal inspectorslaterJoundhis name on 
the mailing list for this bookstore. For the next 2 and 112 
years two government agencies (the postal Service and 
the Customs Service) made repeated efforts, through 
five fictitious organizations and a bogus pen pal, to 
ascertain Jacobson's willingness to break a new federal 
law by ordering sexually explicit photographs of children 
through the mail. These agencies finally piqued Jacob-
son's interest, and he ordered a magazine. When he 
received the magazine, he was arrested and his house 
searched. The search disclosed only the Bare Boys 
magazines and the material sent by ttie federal agencies. 
At trial Jacobson asserted the entrapment defense, a 
clairn with which the Supreme Court agreed. The federal 
rule on entrapment (and the majority rule) is known as 
the origin-of-intent test. A defendant must establish (1} 
that the criminal design originated with the police and (2} 
that the defendant was not predisposed to commit the 
crime. The Court explained: 
In their zeal to enforce the law, however, Government 
agents may not originate a criminal design, implant in 
an innocent person's mind the disposition to commit a 
criminal act, and then induce commission of the crime 
so that the Government may prosecute .... Where the 
Government has induced an individual to break the 
law and the defense of entrapment is at issue, as it was 
in this case, the prosecution must prove beyond 
reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to 
commit the criminal act prior to first being approached 
by Government agents. 112 S. Ct. at 1540. 
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Had Jacobson promptly availed himself of the first offer 
to order child pornography, "it is unlikely that his entrap-
ment defense would have warranted a jury instruction." 
/d. at 1541. Such was not the case, however. He was the 
target of 26 months of repeated mailings and communi-
cations from federal agents. He became predisposed 
because of the Government's own conduct. Thus, the 
Court ruled as a matter of law that Jacobson had been 
entrapped. 
INSANITY ACQUITTEE 
_foucll? v. Louisiana, 112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992}, involved a 
state statute that continued the commitment of insanity 
acquittees. Under Louisiana law, a defendant found not 
guilty by reasons of insanity (NGRI) is committed to a 
psychiatric hospital until he proves that he is not danger-
ous. Under this scheme, an acquittee can be detained, 
even if he does not suffer from any mental illness. Foucha 
challenged this procedure as a violation of due process. 
The Supreme Court struck down the Louisiana law. 
The superintendent of the hospital recommended 
Foucha's release because the hospital doctors had found 
no evidence of mental illness since Foucha's admission 
approximately four years earlier. A judge then appointed 
a two-member sanity commission to examine Foucha. 
These doctors found no present mental illness, but they 
cautioned that Foucha suffered from an antisocial 
personality, a condition that is not a mental disease. 
Therefore, they would not certify that Foucha was no 
longer dangerous. 
In Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), the Supreme 
Court had ruled that a person committed to a mental 
institution in a civil proceeding must be shown to be 
dangerous by clear and convincing evidence. The Court, 
however, did not apply the same rule when a defendant is 
acquitted in a criminal trial by reason of insanity. Jones v. 
United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). Under Jones, the 
State need not satisfy the Addington burden in this 
context. In the Court's view, the NGRI verdict established 
that the defendant was mentally ill and still dangerous. In 
Jones, however, the Court also stated that "[t]he commit-
ted acquittee is entitled to release when he has reco-
vered his sanity or is no longer dangerous." 112 S. Ct. at 
1784. This aspect of Jones was based on O'Connor v. 
Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), in which the Court had 
held as a matter of due process that it was unconstitu-
tional for the State to continue to confine a mentally ill 
person who is not dangerous. 
Louisiana did not contend that Foucha was mentally ill 
at the time of the hearing, only that he was dangerous. 
Thus, according to the Court, "the basis for holding 
Foucha in a psychiatric facility as an insanity acquittee 
has disappeared, and the State is no longer entitled to 
hold him on that basis." 112 S. Ct. at 1784. Moreover, the 
Court ruled that confinement based on his antisocial 
personality violated due process. 
ANTIPSYCHOTIC MEDICATION AT TRIAL 
David Riggins was charged with murder and robbery. 
Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S. Ct. 1810 (1992). After his arrest, 
a psychiatrist began treatment with thrioridazine, an 
antipsychotic drug. The dosage was raised when Riggins 
continued to "hear voices" and experience sleep problems. 
Because the defense intended to rely on an insanity 
defense, it moved to suspend the medication until after 
trial, contending that Riggins had a right to show the jury 
his true mental state. The trial court refused, and Riggins 
was forced to receive the medication during trial. 
The Supreme Court ruled in Riggins favor. In Washing-
ton v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990), the Court had ruled 
that due process permits a mentally ill prison inmate to 
be treated involuntarily with antipsychotic drugs where 
there is a determination that "the inmate is dangerous to 
himself or others and the treatment is in the inmate's 
medical interest." /d. at 227. The Court, however, recog-
nized that an inmate's interest in avoiding involuntary 
administration of antipsychotic drugs raised due process 
issues. Thus, once Riggins moved to terminate treat-
ment, the State became obligated to establish the need 
for the drug's continued use. 
The prosecution might have prevailed had it shown 
that the medication was required to protect Riggins or 
others, or to ensure that he was competent to stand trial. 
The trial court, however, had made no findings about the 
need for the drug or the availability of reasonable alterna-
tives. Moreover, the record did show that the medication 
may have hampered Riggins' defense. The side effects 
could make him "uptight," drowsy, or confused. "It is 
clearly possible that such side effects impacted not just 
Riggins' outward appearance, but also the content of his 
testimony on direct or cross-examination, his ability to 
follow the proceedings, or the substance of his communi-
cation with counsel." !d. at 1816. Thus, there existed a 
strong possibility that Riggins' defense was impaired due 
to the administration of the drug. The Court noted: 
Because the record contains no finding that might 
support a conclusion that administration of antipsy-
chotic medication was necessary to accomplish an 
essential state policy, ... we have no basis for saying 
that the substantial probability of trial prejudice in this 
case was justified. /d. at 1817. 
Significantly, the Court also noted what was not decided. 
Riggins never argued that he had a right to be tried without 
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the medication if its discontinuation would render him 
incompetent to stand trial. The Court observed: "The 
question whether a competent criminal defendant may 
refuse antipsychotic medication if cessation of medica-
tion would render him incompetent at trial is not before 
us." /d. at 1815. 
EXTRADICTION 
United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188 
(1992), concerned the abduction of a Mexican national in 
Mexico and his repatriation to the United States for trial. 
He was indicted for participating in the murder of a DEA 
agent in Mexico. DEA officials were responsible for his 
abduction, although they were not personally involved in 
it. The defendant moved to dismiss the prosecution, 
arguing that his abduction violated an extradition treaty 
between Mexico and the United States. 
Several early precedents touched upon this issue. In 
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886), the Court had ruled 
that the abduction of Ker from Peru did not preclude his 
trial in the United States. The Ker rule later was applied in 
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952), in which a defen-
dant was kidnaped in Chicago by Michigan officers and 
brought to trial in Michigan. The Court wrote: "There is 
nothing in the Constitution that requires a court to permit 
a guilty person rightfully convicted to escape justice 
because he was brought to trial against his will." /d. at 522. 
In the Court's view the Ker-Frisbie line of cases 
contmlled unless the extradiction treaty between the 
United States and Mexico prohibited abductions. Noth-
ing in the Treaty required either nation to refrain from 
forcible abduction, nor is extradiction specified as the 
only method of proceeding. The Court refused to infer a 
prohibition against abduction. Even if the abduction is 
"shocking" and a violation of international law, it is not 
prohibited by the Treaty and thus is a matter for the 
Executive Branch. 
Justice Stevens, in dissent, referred to the majority 
position as "monstrous." 
